Frequently Asked Questions

When selecting a supplier to fulfill your inspection needs, you need to be confident that the Inspection Body can supply you with a technically competent service and with consistently reliable results.

ENEFEN was the FIRST Inspection Body in Canada accredited to ISO/IEC 17020-2012. For more information see our About Us web page.

Many companies provide inspection services, sometimes at a low cost or high cost. Before commissioning an organisation to undertake such work, it is important to know the risks. Ask yourself:

Are you confident that the organisation has the technical competence to undertake the work in question?
Are you satisfied that the organisation has the resources to do the work?
Are your needs for impartiality and integrity met by the application of suitable procedures in the organisation?
Are you confident that the organisation has an adequate quality management system in place to provide a service that consistently meets your needs and expectations?

The technical competence of an inspection body depends on a number of factors including:

staff with sound knowledge, skills, experience and professional judgement
the right equipment – properly maintained and, where necessary, calibrated
appropriate sampling practices
sound inspection procedures
accurate recording and reporting of evidence and inspection results
adequate quality assurance and quality control
Knowledge of national and local compliance regulations

Accredited inspection bodies are able to issue inspection reports or certificates bearing the symbol of the accreditation body that provides the accreditation.As an inspection body gains ISO/IEC 17020 accreditation for specific inspections, you should check that the inspection body is accredited for the inspections you need. This detail is specified in the Scope of Accreditation, which may be supplied by the inspection body or the accreditation body on request.Accreditation bodies publish lists or directories of the inspection bodies they have accredited (www.scc.ca for Standards Council of Canada), together with contact details and information on their accredited inspection capabilities.You can therefore contact the accreditation body and find out whether there are any accredited inspection bodies that can perform the inspections you require.Alternatively, try contacting your national standards body or your ministry for industry or technology for the necessary contact details.ENEFEN is accredited and you can find the scope of accreditation on our accreditation page.

Yes, we are accredited to do both design and inspection.

As a Type C accredited Inspection Body (IB), ENEFEN has been accredited to provide first party inspections, second party inspections, or both, which form an identifiable but not necessarily a separate part of an organization involved in the design, manufacture, supply, installation, use or maintenance of the items it inspects and which supplies inspection services to its parent organization or to other parties, or to both.

The CSA B149.1 and CSA B149.3 Codes require use of "certified" components. What does this mean?When it comes to manual valves there are specific references in the code to 4 valves in the fuel train (for a single burner / single fuel configuration):- certified main fuel inlet valve (the upstream valves which is used to shut ALL fuel off)- certified pilot fuel takeoff valve (at the split of pilot fuel from the main line)- certified pilot burner test valve (also called pilot firing cock), and- certified main burner test valve (also called main burner firing cock)There is a definition in the Codes of what certified means, which is basically tested by a recognized certification organization (such as CSA, UL, Intertek, FM) to published standards. There are specific testing standards for manual fuel shutoff valves, for example CSA 3.16 standard for ball valves or CSA 3.11 standard for quarter-turn lubricated plug valves used for this aplication.In addition, Codes require that these valves be quarter-turn, that the handle must be non removable and must be parallel to the flow of fuel when valve is open, and that these valves are easily accessible to the operator. Until about 15 years ago the only valves which could be used legally for this service in Canada were the quarter-turn lubricated metal-to-metal plug cocks. Then gradually ball valves with elastomeric seats were added to the approved list.The intent behind all of this is that an operator must be able to easily see if the valve is open, closed or partially open, and must be able to quickly close the valve in emergency. Plug or gate valves do not meet this safety requirement and this is why they will never be considered suitable/certified for this application.There is no question that a good quality plug valve will hold the fuel pressure which is not very high to start with, but the standards are written around the operational availability, access for quick shutoff and indication of valve position visible from a distance.With plug valves, or even worse with needle valve, one cannot easily tell just by looking at them if valve is fully open or closed and it takes "long" time (30 seconds versus 1 second with ball valve) to close these valves.There are a number of companies making certified valves for fuel shutoff. At the end the issue of using certified versus non-certified manual valves for fuel shutoff is not much different from using certified versus non-certified disconnect switches for electrical equipment.A separate issue is that of manual valves on pressure switches. To start, codes prohibit ANY valves on pressures switches or transmitters used as safety permissives. There is simply too much risk in closing the valve "by mistake" or intentionally thus disabling the permissive. This is similar to trying to use manual valves on PSV lines from pressure vessels. We have been getting away with using valves under pressure switches for calibration purposes under a variance issued by AMA. However the valves must be quarter turn and locked and taged in open position. So it is obvious just by looking at them that they are important for safety. You cannot get that with barstock needle valves for example or non lockable ball valves from China.Finally, for aproval of SAFETY SYSTEMS we need to evaluate all components for their suitability for service. And for that we need some proof that the valves were pressure tested, have CRN number in Canada, and that materials of construction are suitable for the service which in some cases involves higher pressures and wet and sour gas.Brass valves and components used for this corrosive environment are questionable. 316L valves such as Swagelok are probably more costly but better quality than NEO valves. The easiest and most economical way to get a field approval is to use NEO 2500 series ball valves which come with right paperwork and are well proven in this application and readily available.We work in a heavy resource industry which has high safety requirements and expectation of ruggedness and reliability. Our industry is all about certifications and testing and "proper paperwork". We as engineers are obliged to uphold these requirements. Trying to make things cheaper and without ANY testing and PAPERWORK can be only considered to be poor workmanship and negligence.Evaluation costs time and money and in some cases is difficult to do. To reduce costs in the long run you are better off to to do it right at the beginning.

When it comes to multiple burners, the key aspect of the CSA B149.3 is the type of the flame safeguard logic.MBFSG - Multiple Burner Flame Safeguard is a design in which all burners must start at once and if one of them trips or is shut down, all the other burners must trip with it at the same time. There is no option under this design to keep running, for example, if only 2 burners trip. It is either ALL burners or NONE.IBFSG - Individual Burner Flame Safeguard is a design in which any burner can be started individually, and if one burner trips or is shut down, the other burners keep running.

CSA B149.3 Code section 5.6 requires that:5.6.1Construction of a burner and any component parts shall be in accordance with reasonable concepts of safety, substantiality, and durability.5.6.2A burner shall be of a design that is compatible with the intended application and shall incorporate features that will ensure safe operation.5.6.3A burner shall be provided with a means to(a) be firmly secured in place to maintain its correct position;(b) prevent accidental movement of any adjustable part; and(c) maintain complete and stable combustion under all operating conditions.5.6.4A burner shall maintain stability of the designed flame shape, with neither flashback nor blow-‐off, over the entire range of turndown that will be encountered during operation, when supplied with combustion air and the designed fuels in the proper proportions and in the proper pressure ranges.” Consequently it is in our interpretation of the Code and of reasonable concepts of safety, suitability and durability that it is NOT OK to:

not support the burner or its pilot properly
let the burner or pilot be misaligned in the fire tube or furnace
allow flame to impinge on any surfaces which are not meant to be hit by flame including heat transfer area or any other appliance parts (such as outside part of the firetube)
allow burner to overheat and eventually crack supporting welds
burn paint off any part of the appliance
allow burner to lose flame stability at any part of its firing range, and especially its minimum or maximum fire
not be able to control the combustion air flow either in forced draft or natural draft designs
operate outside of its design pressure range between minimum and maximum fire
produce high CO, deposit carbon on heat exchanger or in the stack
result in excessive condensation and water collection inside the appliance without proper drainage
produce excessive noise, vibration, puffs (explosions), smoke, visible flame, excessive surface temperatures , etc, which may be unsafe or detrimental to the appliance itself, or to the process, personnel, public, or environment

The instrument venting requirements are described in the CSA B 149.1, CSA B149.2, and B149.3 Codes. Since the wording of these standards is somewhat convoluted we recommend for industrial installations a simpler practical guideline:

1. Vent connection size from any device shall not be reduced below the connection size of that device, but in no case shall be less than equivalent to 1/4" Sch 40 pipe ID = 0.364". (Note: We do accept 3/8" OD 0.035" wall instrument tubing although its ID is slightly smaller than that).

2. Vent lines longer than 50 ft shall be increased by one pipe or tube diameter for each additional 50 ft length, with the increase starting at the connection to the device (this means that the vent line has to be bigger from the start and not that it has to be gradually increased)

3. Vent lines shall be made of seamless steel, aluminum, or stainless steel tubing, or seamless carbon steel pipe (SCE 40 pipe is sufficient).

4. When possible each device shall be vented separately (on small skid packages this is usually simpler and less costly than building vent headers)

5. When multiple devices other than pressure relief devices (separate PSV or PSV internal to a PRV) are connected to a single vent line, this vent line shall have an area of not less than twice the total area of the connected vents. [Use formula => sqr((D1^2 + D2^2 + ....... + Dn^2)*2) ]

6. Multiple pressure relief devices (separate PSV or PSV internal to a PRV) may be connected to a single vent line if the inlet pressures do not vary be more than 10% and this vent line has an area equal to the largest device opening plus 50% of the total area of other device openings.

7. The outdoor vent termination shall be equipped with a means to prevent the entry of water, insects and other foreign objects. (typically this means a "candy-cane" or 90EL termination pointing downwards and a screen at the outlet)

8. There shall be no valves, reductions, or other devices installed in the vent lines which could impede their operation, or in any way made them ineffective, isolated or bypassed.

9. All vents shall be terminated at a "safe location" including:
a) not directed at operators face or any part of operator's body
b) not located near walkways, driveways, stairs, access ladders, manual valves or other devices where operator's or public presence may be foreseen.
c) not terminated under the buildings, soffits or any areas where vented gas may be trapped or accumulate
d) not terminated in locations which may be covered by snow, ice, leaves, plants, or any other objects which may impede venting
e) at least 1 meter away from building openings (windows, doors, vent louvers or cut-outs, etc), appliance vent outlets, or moisture exhaust ducts
f) at least 3 meters away from mechanical air intakes (equipped with a fan), appliance air intake, or source of ignition.
g) not located so that prevailing winds, downdrafts or gas buoyancy (negative or positive) could blow the gas back towards the above "unsafe locations"
h) preferably directed "up and away" to allow any vented gas to be safely dispersed to the outside air.
i) when vented gas contains poisonous compounds (such as H2S) additional precautions shall be taken to ensure its "safe" venting, including extending the above minimum distances and/or disposing of the vent gas to appropriately sized flare headers.

Our statement: " Secondary Fuel Type : Not approved for secondary fuel use ...." means that we know that secondary fuel(s) will be used but we cannot determine at this stage if it will be done in a safe manner. In other words we do not know what will happen when you add secondary fuel(s) and we do not want to be liable for allowing you to do that. Once you add another fuel you have the choice to either get us back to augment the field approval to use secondary fuel(s) or use the system at your own risk.

At this point you are not required in Alberta to obtain a field approval for fuels other than natural gas or propane, unless the use of these fuels affects safety of the natural gas or propane fired system.

The objective of a Field Approval is to have a SAFE appliance. Therefore we have to look at all aspects which may affect safety. The B149 codes are indeed limited to natural gas, propane and some other gases, however, they also include other requirements such as pre-purge, trial for ignition, fuel shutoff, etc.

When it comes to "other" flammable substances or streams which may be present inside an appliance, they clearly cannot be ignored when considering safety. This applies to streams such as waste gases, liquid fuels and also solid fuels (dust) such as wood, biomass or coal.

With a Kiln for example, it would not be safe to try pilot ignition in an appliance which is full of explosive gas or pulverized coal dust. Also the pre-purge would be meaningless if these "other" fuels were kept going. If you have not submitted anything on how this will be done we cannot determine if it will be done in a safe manner. We would need to know if there will also be other fuels. Although the natural gas control system is separate from another system it may not be entirely so. If natural gas is needed to preheat a kiln prior to introduction of coal, and if the control system switches back to natural gas in case of coal supply failure then the systems are not completely separate. There are very likely interlocks between the systems which affect pre-purge sequence, timing, trips, temperatures, etc. In this sense the application is in our eyes not that much different from other process equipment such as reaction furnaces or waste gas incinerators.

Previous experience with kilns has shown appliances typically had a natural gas pilot (base gun) which was kept going after the switch to another fuel. In a few cases we have seen natural gas added directly to the pulverized coal burner to improve and stabilize mixture flammability. So the natural gas control system was operating simultaneously to the coal delivery system. Which means that the UV scanner kept looking at the natural gas flame while the IR scanner looked at the coal flame. A system trip would affect both. Then a restart would also involve both systems.

For questions specific to your equipment you may contact Susan at 780-665-2863 ext. 17 or email [email protected]